Agent coordination

Multi-agent sandbox and tools

Each agent in a multi-agent setup can override the global sandbox and tool policy. This page covers per-agent configuration, precedence rules, and examples.

Sandboxing

Backends and modes — full sandbox reference.

Sandbox vs tool policy vs elevated

Debug "why is this blocked?"

Elevated mode

Elevated exec for trusted senders.

Configuration examples

Example 1: Personal + restricted family agent

{
  "agents": {
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "main",
        "default": true,
        "name": "Personal Assistant",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
        "sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
      },
      {
        "id": "family",
        "name": "Family Bot",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-family",
        "sandbox": {
          "mode": "all",
          "scope": "agent"
        },
        "tools": {
          "allow": ["read"],
          "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process", "browser"]
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "bindings": [
    {
      "agentId": "family",
      "match": {
        "provider": "whatsapp",
        "accountId": "*",
        "peer": {
          "kind": "group",
          "id": "[email protected]"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}

Result:

main agent: runs on host, full tool access.
family agent: runs in Docker (one container per agent), only read tool.

Example 2: Work agent with shared sandbox

{
  "agents": {
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "personal",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-personal",
        "sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
      },
      {
        "id": "work",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-work",
        "sandbox": {
          "mode": "all",
          "scope": "shared",
          "workspaceRoot": "/tmp/work-sandboxes"
        },
        "tools": {
          "allow": ["read", "write", "apply_patch", "exec"],
          "deny": ["browser", "gateway", "discord"]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

Example 2b: Global coding profile + messaging-only agent

{
  "tools": { "profile": "coding" },
  "agents": {
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "support",
        "tools": { "profile": "messaging", "allow": ["slack"] }
      }
    ]
  }
}

Result:

default agents get coding tools.
support agent is messaging-only (+ Slack tool).

Example 3: Different sandbox modes per agent

{
  "agents": {
    "defaults": {
      "sandbox": {
        "mode": "non-main",
        "scope": "session"
      }
    },
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "main",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
        "sandbox": {
          "mode": "off"
        }
      },
      {
        "id": "public",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-public",
        "sandbox": {
          "mode": "all",
          "scope": "agent"
        },
        "tools": {
          "allow": ["read"],
          "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch"]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

Configuration precedence

When both global (agents.defaults.*) and agent-specific (agents.list[].*) configs exist:

Sandbox config

Agent-specific settings override global:

agents.list[].sandbox.mode > agents.defaults.sandbox.mode
agents.list[].sandbox.scope > agents.defaults.sandbox.scope
agents.list[].sandbox.workspaceRoot > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceRoot
agents.list[].sandbox.workspaceAccess > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess
agents.list[].sandbox.docker.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.*
agents.list[].sandbox.browser.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.*
agents.list[].sandbox.prune.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.prune.*

Tool restrictions

The filtering order is:

Tool profile

tools.profile or agents.list[].tools.profile.

Provider tool profile

tools.byProvider[provider].profile or agents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].profile.

Global tool policy

tools.allow / tools.deny.

Provider tool policy

tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny.

Agent-specific tool policy

agents.list[].tools.allow/deny.

Agent provider policy

agents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny.

Sandbox tool policy

tools.sandbox.tools or agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools.

Subagent tool policy

tools.subagents.tools, if applicable.

Precedence rules

Each level can further restrict tools, but cannot grant back denied tools from earlier levels.
If agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools is set, it replaces tools.sandbox.tools for that agent.
If agents.list[].tools.profile is set, it overrides tools.profile for that agent.
Provider tool keys accept either provider (e.g. google-antigravity) or provider/model (e.g. openai/gpt-5.4).

Empty allowlist behavior

If any explicit allowlist in that chain leaves the run with no callable tools, OpenClaw stops before submitting the prompt to the model. This is intentional: an agent configured with a missing tool such as agents.list[].tools.allow: ["query_db"] should fail loudly until the plugin that registers query_db is enabled, not continue as a text-only agent.

Tool policies support group:* shorthands that expand to multiple tools. See Tool groups for the full list.

Per-agent elevated overrides (agents.list[].tools.elevated) can further restrict elevated exec for specific agents. See Elevated mode for details.

Migration from single agent

Before (single agent)

{
  "agents": {
    "defaults": {
      "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
      "sandbox": {
        "mode": "non-main"
      }
    }
  },
  "tools": {
    "sandbox": {
      "tools": {
        "allow": ["read", "write", "apply_patch", "exec"],
        "deny": []
      }
    }
  }
}

After (multi-agent)

{
  "agents": {
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "main",
        "default": true,
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
        "sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
      }
    ]
  }
}

Tool restriction examples

Read-only agent

{
  "tools": {
    "allow": ["read"],
    "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process"]
  }
}

Safe execution (no file modifications)

{
  "tools": {
    "allow": ["read", "exec", "process"],
    "deny": ["write", "edit", "apply_patch", "browser", "gateway"]
  }
}

Communication-only

{
  "tools": {
    "sessions": { "visibility": "tree" },
    "allow": ["sessions_list", "sessions_send", "sessions_history", "session_status"],
    "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "read", "browser"]
  }
}

sessions_history in this profile still returns a bounded, sanitized recall view rather than a raw transcript dump. Assistant recall strips thinking tags, <relevant-memories> scaffolding, plain-text tool-call XML payloads (including <tool_call>...</tool_call>, <function_call>...</function_call>, <tool_calls>...</tool_calls>, <function_calls>...</function_calls>, and truncated tool-call blocks), downgraded tool-call scaffolding, leaked ASCII/full-width model control tokens, and malformed MiniMax tool-call XML before redaction/truncation.

Common pitfall: "non-main"

Testing

After configuring multi-agent sandbox and tools:

Check agent resolution

openclaw agents list --bindings

Verify sandbox containers

docker ps --filter "name=openclaw-sbx-"

Test tool restrictions

Send a message requiring restricted tools.
Verify the agent cannot use denied tools.

Monitor logs

tail -f "${OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR:-$HOME/.openclaw}/logs/gateway.log" | grep -E "routing|sandbox|tools"

Troubleshooting

Agent not sandboxed despite `mode: 'all'`

Check if there's a global agents.defaults.sandbox.mode that overrides it.
Agent-specific config takes precedence, so set agents.list[].sandbox.mode: "all".

Tools still available despite deny list

Check tool filtering order: global → agent → sandbox → subagent.
Each level can only further restrict, not grant back.
Verify with logs: [tools] filtering tools for agent:${agentId}.

Container not isolated per agent

Set scope: "agent" in agent-specific sandbox config.
Default is "session" which creates one container per session.

Elevated mode
Multi-agent routing
Sandbox configuration
Sandbox vs tool policy vs elevated — debugging "why is this blocked?"
Sandboxing — full sandbox reference (modes, scopes, backends, images)
Session management